Abstract-In cognitive radio networks (CRNs), secondary users must be able to accurately and reliably track the location of small-scale mobile primary users/devices (e.g., wireless microphones) in order to efficiently utilize spatial spectrum opportunities, while protecting primary communications. However, accurate tracking of the location of mobile primary users is difficult due mainly to the CR-unique constraint, i.e., localization must rely solely on reported sensing results (i.e., measured primary signal strengths), which can easily be compromised by malicious sensors (or attackers). To cope with this challenge, we propose a new framework, called Sequential mOnte carLo combIned with shadow-faDing estimation (SOLID), for accurate, attack/fault-tolerant tracking of small-scale mobile primary users. The key idea underlying SOLID is to exploit the temporal shadow fading correlation in sensing results induced by the primary user's mobility. Specifically, SOLID augments conventional Sequential Monte Carlo (SMC)-based target tracking with shadow-fading estimation. By examining the shadow-fading gain between the primary transmitter and CRs/sensors, SOLID 1) significantly improves the accuracy of primary tracking regardless of the presence/absence of attack, and 2) successfully masks the abnormal sensing reports due to sensor faults or attacks, preserving localization accuracy and improving spatial spectrum efficiency. Our extensive evaluation in realistic wireless fading environments shows that SOLID lowers localization error by up to 88 percent in the absence of attacks, and 89 percent in the presence of the challenging "slow-poisoning" attack, compared to the conventional SMC-based tracking.
INTRODUCTION
C OGNITIVE radio (CR) has great potential to enhance spectrum efficiency by allowing secondary (unlicensed) users/devices to utilize spectrum opportunities temporarily unused by primary users (PUs). CRs are key components of efficient detection and reuse of spectrum opportunities, thus mitigating the spectrum-scarcity problem that we may soon face due to the explosive growth of wireless/mobile users, services and applications. As a first step toward realizing opportunistic spectrum access, the FCC recently finalized a ruling that permits the operation of unlicensed CR devices in TV white space (TVWS) [1] . This new use of TVWS has generated an interest in and need for developing numerous standards and proposals, such as IEEE 802.22 wireless regional area networks (WRANs) [2] , IEEE 802.11af [3] , Ecma 392 [4] and White-Fi [5] .
Unlike the detection of large-scale primaries, e.g., DTV users, where localization is not the primary concern in opportunistic spectrum reuse, accurately tracking the physical location of small-scale mobile primaries, such as wireless microphones (WMs), is crucial in achieving the core objectives and functionalities of CRNs, such as spatial spectrum reuse [6] , interference management [7] , [8] , routing decisions [9] , and falsified primary signal detection [10] , [11] . For example, knowing the location of the primary transmitter enables secondary users (SUs) to reuse licensed spectrum more efficiently without causing excessive interference to primary communications [6] , [7] , [8] , [12] . In the IEEE 802. 22 WRANs, without knowing the location of a WM, all the SUs, also called consumer premise equipment (CPE) in an 802.22 cell (of radius up to 100 km), must immediately vacate the current operating channel upon detection of the WM, resulting in significant waste of spatial spectrum opportunities [6] . Furthermore, location information is very useful in cooperative sensing by enabling the secondary base station (BS) (or the fusion center) to select an optimal set of sensors, 1 especially when a very weak primary signal like a WM signal is to be detected [13] , [14] .
However, CRN faces unique challenges, such as the absence of primary-secondary coordination and low sensor density, that make it difficult to track mobile primaries accurately. According to the FCC, opportunistic spectrum access should require no modification to the primary system [15] . Thus, SUs (sensors) must rely solely on measured received signal strengths (RSSs) (obtained via spectrum sensing) for primary tracking. This makes the primary tracking vulnerable to attacks, since the tracking process can be disrupted by malicious or faulty sensors that report incorrect RSSs. A sensing report falsification attack can easily be launched by attackers due to the open nature of low-layer protocol stacks in software-defined radio (SDR) devices, such as USRP [16] and Sora [17] . Moreover, low sensor density in CRNs hampers the accurate tracking of mobile PUs, e.g., the average sensor density in 802. 22 WRANs is only about 1:25=km 2 [18] . Inaccurate location estimation may ultimately cause SUs to generate excessive interference to the primary system, violating the basic premise of CRNs and discouraging PUs from sharing their licensed spectrum bands with SUs. Therefore, there is a clear need for an efficient and secure tracking scheme for small-scale mobile PUs in CRNs.
In this paper, we address the problem of accurately and reliably tracking small-scale mobile PUs in CRNs. Specifically, we design an RSS-based tracking scheme, called SOLID, that augments the conventional Sequential Monte Carlo (SMC)-based localization with shadow fading estimation. The shadowing estimation in SOLID greatly improves localization performance. Besides, by monitoring temporally-correlated shadow fading, SOLID accurately detects both manipulated and erroneous sensing reports, thus achieving high robustness. The key motivation behind exploiting temporal shadowing correlation in attack detection is that malicious sensors cannot control the physicallayer signal-propagation characteristics. While we focus on the robust tracking of the WMs' locations in 802.22 WRANs, our proposed techniques are generic and can be used for detecting other types of small-scale primaries or, in a broader context, target tracking in wireless sensor networks.
Contributions
This paper makes the following main contributions:
. Development of a new tracking scheme, SOLID, that jointly estimates the mobile PU's location and shadow-fading gains using an adaptive filter. By exploiting the temporal correlation in shadow fading, SOLID -improves localization accuracy and -accurately identifies abnormal sensing reports. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to incorporate shadow fading into cooperative localization. . In-depth evaluation of SOLID in a realistic shadowfading environment under various attack scenarios. Our extensive simulation study shows that in the absence of an attack, SOLID lowers the average localization error by up to 88 percent compared to the conventional Sequential Monte Carlo-based tracking scheme, since the two components of SOLID-SMC-based localization and shadow-fading estimation-refine each other throughout the tracking process. . High attack and fault-tolerance of SOLID. Our evaluation results show that SOLID can detect compromised sensing reports with high accuracy, e.g., attack false-alarm and misdetection rates below 1 and 7 percent, respectively. It also shows that in a realistic shadowing and multipath environment, SOLID lowers the average error by up to 89 percent, even under "slow-poisoning" attacks. . Investigation of the tradeoff in the design of the attack detector in SOLID. When the base station filters out sensors or sensing reports too aggressively (or conservatively), the localization can suffer from lack of samples (compromised sensing reports). Via in-depth simulation, we identify the impact of attack detection thresholds, and the results provide practical guidelines for the design of a robust and efficient tracking scheme.
Organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews related work, while Section 3 describes the system models and assumptions, and introduces the attack models. Section 4 presents our proposed approach for attack detection, and the underlying localization protocol. Section 5 details our approach to the estimation of shadow fading, and the design of SOLID's attack detector. Section 6 evaluates the performance of SOLID, and Section 7 concludes the paper.
RELATED WORK
In this section, we first review related work on existing sensing-targeted attacks, and then discuss existing targettracking schemes in wireless sensor networks.
Secure Spectrum Sensing in CRNs
CRN security has recently become a topic of great interest to the research community. Of the various potential threats, two types of attacks that exploit the vulnerabilities in spectrum sensing have been studied: primary user emulation attack (PUEA) and spectrum sensing data falsification (SSDF) attack. The defense against PUEA has been studied in [19] , [20] . Chen et al. [10] proposed an RSS-based location verification scheme, called LocDef, to detect fake primary signals. Liu et al. [20] developed a primary signal verification scheme by jointly exploiting the location-dependent link signature, i.e., multipath fading profile, and conventional cryptographic authentication methods. However, their scheme assumes the availability of a helper node, located close to each primary transmitter. The problem of ensuring robustness in distributed sensing has also been studied [21] , [22] , [23] . Kaligineedi et al. [22] presented a prefiltering scheme based on a simple outlier method that filters out extremely low or high sensor reports. However, their method is unsuitable for a very low SNR environment, such as 802. 22 WRANs, in which the final data-fusion decision is very sensitive to small deviations in RSSs. Min and Shin [23] proposed an attack-tolerant secure cooperative sensing scheme that exploits shadow-fading correlation in RSS among neighboring sensors. Recently, Duan et al. [24] considered scenarios, in which attackers collaborate to maximize their impact, and proposed mechanisms to discourage and disincentivize the attackers from mounting collaborative attacks. Min et al. [25] developed a collaborative attack-detection framework, called IRIS, that accurately detects the presence of an attack and identifies the attacker by checking for consistency among sensing reports. Unlike these studies, we focus on a new type of attack, i.e., disruption of location tracking of a mobile primary transmitter by falsifying sensor reports.
Secure Mobile Target Tracking
The problem of node localization and target tracking has been studied extensively in the area of wireless sensor networks [26] , [27] , [28] , [29] , [30] . For example, Sheng et al. [31] proposed the use of distributed particle filters to track multiple mobile targets in wireless sensor networks. The primary tracking in CRNs, however, faces unique challenges.
In CRNs, it is not desirable to modify the primary system, and thus, the information on the received primary signal strengths obtained via spectrum sensing is only available to the secondary system. The solution approach taken by SOLID to overcome this challenge differs from others in that it only relies on PHY-layer signal-propagation characteristics (i.e., temporally correlated shadow fading) to accurately detect malicious sensors, which has not been considered before.
SYSTEM AND ATTACK MODELS
In this section, we describe the network, spectrum sensing, and signal-propagation models that we use throughout the paper. We then present an overview of our model for tracking a small-scale mobile primary transmitter and introduce the attack model.
CR Network Model and Assumptions
We consider a CRN that consists of primary and secondary users/devices in the same geographical area. For cooperative spectrum sensing, the BS employs the sensors located within a fusion range centered at the estimated primary location [14] . 2 We call such sensors cooperative sensors. The BS uses sensing reports to update the estimate of the primary transmitter's location, and estimates shadow-fading gains between the primary transmitter and each cooperative sensor.
Sensors are stationary and the BS has the location information of the sensors within its own cell. For example, the IEEE 802.22 WRAN standard draft requires the BS to know the sensor locations. We assume that the sensors have been deployed in an area A, e.g., an IEEE 802.22 WRAN cell, following a point Poisson process with average density . The Poisson process is widely used to describe sensor distributions in wireless networks. However, the design of SOLID is generic and does not depend on any particular sensor distribution, so it can be applied to CRNs with arbitrary sensor distributions. The Poisson process is a reasonable assumption in the absence of a known distribution that accurately models the sensor (i.e., CPE) distribution in 802.22 WRANs. Unlike in a typical wireless sensor network environment, in which sensors are densely distributed, we assume a low sensor density because the typical density of CPEs in rural areas is only 1:25=km 2 [32] . We assume that the BS and sensors communicate sensing information over a common control channel.
Spectrum-Sensing and Signal-Propagation Models
Due to the lack of primary-secondary cooperation, primary tracking must be done based only on the received primary signal strengths measured at cooperative sensors. 3 We consider energy detection [33] for spectrum sensing in the PHY-layer. Energy detection is the most widely used PHYlayer sensing technique due to its simple design and low sensing overhead. The test statistics of the energy detector are an estimate of the sum of received primary signal strength and noise power [33] . We assume that the BS employs only the sensors located close to the primary transmitter, i.e., located within the fusion range R s (e.g., 1 km) from the estimated location of a primary transmitter, for location tracking. This is a reasonable assumption because the reports from sensors located far away from the WM transmitter will be close to the noise level, and thus, do not contribute to the improvement of localization accuracy [14] . The BS directs the cooperative sensors to perform spectrum sensing at a periodic time interval t 2 T , and report their sensing results to the BS for localization. Fig. 1 depicts an example scenario, tracking a mobile primary transmitter in a CRN.
Assuming that the noise power is much smaller than the received primary signal strength, sensor n's measurement in sensing time slot t can be expressed as [34] 
where is the path-loss exponent, d o the reference distance, P o the received primary signal strength at the reference distance, d t;n the distance between the primary transmitter and sensor n in time slot t. Log-normal shadow fading, denoted by X t;n , can be characterized by dB-spread, dB , where X t;n $ N ð0; 2 dB Þ. 4 We assume that nonfading components, such as antenna and device losses, are approximated as an i.i.d. Gaussian random variable with zero mean and variance 2 m , denoted as Y t;n $ N ð0; 2 m Þ 8n. Let S t denote a set of cooperating sensors in time slot t. Then, the received primary signal strength at cooperating sensors in (1) can be expressed in a vector form as 2. We focus on the tracking of a mobile PU's location after its detection. The problem of detecting a PU and its location estimate has been addressed in [14] .
where Hðd t Þ ¼ ½ hðd t;1 Þ; . . . ; hðd t;jStj Þ T represents the received signal strength due to path-loss, where hðd t;i Þ ¼ P o þ 10 logðd o Þ À 10 logðd t;i Þ. The shadow fading gain and noise vectors are denoted by b X t and Y t , respectively. Note that while we consider PU tracking in an outdoor environment where large-scale transmitters' signal propagation can be accurately modeled or trained based on terrain profiles, the problem would be more challenging if the signal propagation were more random and unpredictable, e.g., an indoor environment. The extension of SOLID to such a challenging environment will be part of our future inquiry.
Attack Model
In CRNs, sensors are often deployed in hostile and unattended areas, so they can be captured by attackers. The compromised sensors' reports can then be manipulated to amplify localization error, resulting in either inefficient use of available spectrum (due to conservative spectrum reuse to avoid interference to PUs' communications), or excessive interference to PUs (due to aggressive spectrum reuse based on incorrect PU location estimation). Selfish SUs can manipulate their sensing reports to influence the localization result so that neighboring SUs vacate the channel. As a result, selfish SUs can receive higher bandwidth at the expense of other honest SUs.
The main objective of attackers (compromised or selfish sensors) is to disrupt the primary transmitter localization/ tracking process by manipulating sensing reports. Specifically, we consider the following scenarios: a sensor is . compromised, reporting manipulated (i.e., higher or lower than real) RSSs to the BS, . malfunctioning or faulty, generating sensor readings that significantly deviate from the true RSS. In particular, we introduce the following metrics to describe attack scenarios:
. attacker population represents the fraction of attackers among sensors participating in cooperative sensing (i.e., those employed by the BS for sensing), . attack strength represents the deviation in the sensing reports introduced by an attacker. We assume that attackers are noncooperative and each attacker can thus introduce a different attack strength.
The above attack scenarios render the sensing reports to the fusion center (i.e., the BS) inaccurate, degrading localization/tracking performance. Such large localization error will require SUs to be more conservative in reusing spectrum opportunities, resulting in a waste of spatial spectrum opportunities (see Section 6.5). Therefore, we opt to design an attack-or fault-tolerant primary tracking mechanism that successfully tolerates such manipulated (or erroneous) sensing reports. The attack detection mechanism in SOLID will allow the BS to detect/discard sensing reports or exclude malicious/faulty sensors in cooperative sensing, thus achieving high localization accuracy.
Although there exist other security threats, such as jamming or denial-of-service attacks, in the primary tracking process, the sensing report manipulation attack that we consider in this paper is more stealthy due to the attacker's ability to control sensing reports in a more finegrained manner. Thus, we focus on detecting manipulated (or erroneous) sensing reports instead of addressing all the attack scenarios.
THE PROPOSED APPROACH
We first describe the overall architecture of SOLID and present its design rationale. We then introduce the sequential Monte Carlo localization process that underlies SOLID.
SOLID Architecture
SOLID (Fig. 2) resides at the BS and consists of the following three building blocks:
. Location estimator that tracks the location of a small-scale mobile primary transmitter based on sensing reports, . Shadowing estimator that tracks the shadowing gain at cooperative sensors using the Kalman filter (KF), and . Attack detector that detects and discards abnormal sensing reports, and updates the normal profile. These three components interact with each other synergistically and collectively enable accurate and robust primary tracking. Based on the estimated primary location, the sensor manager selects sensors to cooperate with each other based on their (ab)normality and proximity to the primary transmitter. 5 In particular, the shadowing estimator introduced in SOLID offers two main benefits:
. Improved localization accuracy by mitigating the effect of shadow fading in RSSs (in Fig. 2a) , and . Accurate detection of abnormal sensing reports (in Fig. 2b ).
SOLID also minimizes communication and processing overhead since it exploits physical-layer signal-propagation characteristics, extracted from the cooperative sensing results.
Design Rationale for Attack Detection
To maximize attack tolerance and preserve localization accuracy, SOLID exploits the temporal correlation in shadow Fig. 2 . The SOLID framework. SOLID provides high accuracy and robustness in mobile primary tracking by (a) estimating/monitoring the shadow-fading gains between the primary transmitter and sensors using the Kalman filter, and (b) detecting and filtering out abnormal sensing reports based on the shadowing-correlation profile.
5. Although there are many sophisticated sensor-selection methods for target tracking (e.g., [36] ), optimal sensor-selection is not our focus.
fading in received primary signal strengths. The key insight behind the attack detector is that, in shadow-fading environments, the sequence of RSSs measured at each sensor is highly likely to be correlated as indicated in measurement studies (e.g., [35] , [37] , [38] ). Thus, the attack detector takes an anomaly-detection approach to identifying and discarding abnormal sensing reports in the localization process. So, if attackers raise or lower the sensing results (i.e., RSSs) reported to the BS in order to influence the localization result, SOLID can easily detect them by examining the consistency of the sensing reports. Hence, the attacker must lower its attack strength to evade detection by SOLID, exerting only a negligible impact on localization.
One important, but not so obvious feature of the attack detector in SOLID is that it is cooperative in the sense that the accuracy of shadowing-gain estimation depends heavily on the location estimate, which is updated based on reports from all the cooperating sensors. In other words, the robustness of attack detection is directly correlated with localization accuracy. 39] as the baseline scheme for tracking small-scale mobile PUs. SMC has been widely used as a localization method in mobile wireless systems [40] , [41] . The key idea of SMC is to represent the required posterior density function as a set of random samples (or particles) with their associated weights, and then compute the estimated location by taking their weighted average. SOLID augments the conventional SMC with shadow-fading estimation to further improve the tracking accuracy and achieve robustness against malicious/faulty sensors. Let f j t ¼ ðx t ; y t Þ t 2 INg denote the sequence of a mobile primary's locations in 2D coordinates where t is the index for (sensing) time slots. The BS estimates the primary transmitter's location based on the vector of received primary signal strengths, denoted by P t in (2).
SOLID: Sequential
Let the particle set denote the set of tuples fð where each sample ðiÞ t represents potential PU location and each sample is associated with its weight w ðiÞ t , where P N s i¼1 w ðiÞ t ¼ 1, and N s is the number of particle samples. Then, the primary tracking process in SOLID consists of the following seven steps.
Step 1. At the end of sensing period t, SOLID draws N s new samples 6 using transition probabilities pð 
where v max (m/s) is the maximum speed of the mobile primary transmitter, and is used to generate better samples [41] . We set ¼ 0:2 v max empirically in our simulations.
Step 2. After generating N s new samples using (3), SOLID updates the weights associated with the samples as 
Step 5. SOLID then calculates the effective number of particles, i.e., b
, and compares it against the given threshold N thr . If b N eff < N thr , SOLID resamples the particles using the posterior probability in (5) to replace the current particle set with this new one, and sets the weights w ðiÞ t ¼ 1=N s for i 2 S t . Steps 1-4 repeat themselves until the effective number of particles, b N eff , is equal to, or greater than a given threshold N thr .
Step 6. Given the estimated primary transmitter location in (6) and shadowing gains in the previous time slot, SOLID estimates the shadow-fading gains between the primary transmitter and the sensors, b X t , using the Kalman filter. The presence of temporal correlation in shadow fading allows the Kalman filter to track shadowing gains. It is important to note that the estimated shadowing gains improve localization accuracy by mitigating the uncertainty caused by shadow fading, i.e., X t;n in (1), in sensing results (i.e., measured primary RSS). Likewise, the improved localization enables more accurate shadow fading estimation, and thus, the two methods help each other to improve. As a result, the incorporation of shadow fading estimation in SMC-based localization improves the localization accuracy significantly. This will be detailed in Section 5.2.
Step 7. Based on the estimated shadow-fading gains b X t in Step 6, the attack detector in SOLID filters out abnormal sensors from the tracking process. Joint localization and shadowing estimation enables SOLID to accurately predict the correlated shadow fading. Therefore, even a small disturbance in manipulated sensing reports will make the shadow fading estimation deviate from its prediction, allowing the attack detector to easily identify the compromised ones. We will elaborate on attack-detection design and filtering algorithms in Section 5.3.
Algorithm 1 describes the primary tracking process of SOLID. In this section, we describe the shadowing-estimation component in SOLID, and discuss the attack-detection algorithm of SOLID.
Construction of Shadowing Profile
SOLID constructs and maintains the profile of normal shadow-fading behavior for each cooperative sensor n, based on the history of reports from the sensors during the primary transmitter tracking process. We define the basic profile element (PE) of sensor n as the shadowing component in the received primary signal strengths in (1), i.e.,
where P t;n is the sensor n's measurement report at sensing period t, b d t;n the estimated distance between the primary transmitter and sensor n, which is obtained via SMC, and Y t;n $ N ð0; 2 m Þ the noise power. Suppose that, at time t, SOLID has processed kð! 1Þ PEs for sensor n. Note that k may vary among sensors based on the time they joined the cooperative sensor set. This sequence of PEs exhibits a strong temporal correlation, because SOLID keeps track of each sensor's shadowing gain at each sensing period (e.g., once every 2 seconds). To exploit the temporal correlation in PEs, we define a profile vector consisting of the entire history of PE records: X t;n ðk; 1Þ ¼ ½X t;n ; . . . ; X tÀkþ1;n T ; 1 n N:
Thus, the estimates of the shadowing gain X t;n provide a compact description of the normal shadowing profile. We henceforth omit the subscript t for brevity.
Shadowing Estimation Using Kalman Filter
We now describe how SOLID accurately estimates the PE (i.e., shadowing gain) from the observed primary signal strengths. Specifically, the attack detector in SOLID seeks the shadow-fading estimator that minimizes the mean squared errors (MSE):
where k is the index of the sensing stage since sensor n joined the set of cooperative sensors. We thus need an efficient estimator that minimizes the MSE in (9) . To meet this requirement, SOLID employs the Kalman filter [42] , a recursive estimator that produces optimal estimates by minimizing the MSE in (9) . Note that other adaptive filters, such as the recursive least squares (RLS) filter, can also be used to track the log-normal shadowing gain at the expense of additional computational complexity. In the KF, the system can be modeled as
where S n ðkÞ represents the state (i.e., shadowing gain) of the system, È n ðkÞ is the state-transition matrix that relates the state S n ðkÞ to the next state S n ðk þ 1Þ, W n ðkÞ $ N ð0; QÞ is the system noise vector where the covariance matrix Q represents the degree of variability in the state variables. The measurement of the system is defined as X n ðkÞ ¼ H n ðkÞ S n ðkÞ þ V n ðkÞ; ð11Þ
where the matrix H n ðkÞ represents an observation model that relates the true state variable S n ðkÞ to the measurements X n ðkÞ. The initial value of X n ðkÞ is set to 0. The measurement noise is denoted as V n $ N ð0; RÞ, where the covariance matrix R represents measurement uncertainty. We consider the measurement noise in spectrum sensing due to noise power (i.e., Y t;n in (1)) by setting R ¼ 2 m , and setting Q ¼ 2 ¼ 0:1 2 empirically. The Kalman-filter-based shadow fading estimation in SOLID for sensor n is described as follows:
where M n ðk j k À 1Þ is the one-step minimum prediction MSE, M n ðk j kÞ is the MMSE, and K n ðkÞ is the Kalman gain at stage k. b S n ðk j k À 1Þ is the shadow fading prediction based on the observations fX n ðiÞg kÀ1 i¼0 . The coefficient a is set to 1.
Attack Detection and Filtering
A compromised or malfunctioning sensor node may report a falsified sensing value to the BS. Such manipulated sensing reports may render the localization less reliable, hampering efficient reuse of spectrum opportunities in the spatial domain. To mitigate this problem, SOLID verifies the trustworthiness of sensing reports and filters out or penalizes the bad ones before performing the localization.
SOLID activates an instance of attack-detection scheme whenever the BS employs a sensor for cooperative sensing. The attack detector in SOLID quantifies the deviation of a sensor's shadowing gain from the value predicted from its history by monitoring the prediction error (or measurement residual), which can be computed as
where X n ðkÞ is the observed shadow fading in (7). We introduce a metric for attack detection called prediction error distance (PED) that indicates the euclidean distance in two consecutive prediction errors, i.e., P ED n ðkÞ ¼ e n ðkÞ À e n ðk À 1Þ :
This is a very useful, yet simple, metric because the prediction error is correlated in the absence of an attack, and consequently, the difference in two consecutive errors is kept small. We also observed from our simulation results that P ED n ðkÞ is smaller than the prediction error itself.
The attack detector in SOLID raises a flag to indicate that sensor n's report is compromised (or abnormal) if
where 2 IR is a predefined threshold for detecting anomalies. SOLID classifies a sensor as malicious and excludes it from the localization process if the cumulative number of flags raised is greater than N B , which is a design parameter. Algorithm 2 describes the pseudocode of the attack-detection algorithm in SOLID.
Algorithm 2. ATTACK-DETECTION ALGORITHM IN SOLID
For every newly employed cooperating sensor n, the BS performs 1: Initialization 2: k 0 3: blacklist countðnÞ 0 4: while n 2 S t do 5:
The BS estimates X n ðkÞ using Kalman filter 7:
Compute P ED n ðkÞ using (13) 8:
if P ED n ðkÞ > then 9:
if þ þ blacklist countðnÞ ! N B then 10:
blacklist n 11:
end if 12: if Sensor n is blacklisted then 13:
Exclude sensor n from localization 14:
end if 15: end if 16: end while Note that the attack-detection threshold is carefully designed and securely maintained by the attack detector at the BS, and hence, it may be very difficult, if not impossible, for an attacker to manipulate its attack strength based on the threshold value.
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
SOLID is evaluated using Matlab-based simulation. We first describe the simulation setup and show the efficacy of shadow-fading estimation in SOLID in the absence of attacks. We then demonstrate SOLID's robustness against various attack scenarios including slow-poisoning attacks, and show the tradeoff in determining the attack-detection threshold. Finally, we show SOLID's efficacy in spatial spectrum reuse.
Simulation Setup
We consider a CRN in which sensors are randomly distributed according to a point Poisson process (as discussed in Section 3.1) in a 6 km Â 6 km area with an average sensor density of 3/km 2 , unless otherwise specified. We assume a WM with a transmit-power of 250 mW, which is the maximum transmit-power allowed by the FCC in the UHF band [43] . For WM's mobility, we assume a Random Waypoint model without pause time [44] , which is frequently used in simulations for wireless networks. We assume that the WM moves at a fixed speed of 5 m/s with a destination randomly selected in the simulated network area. For each testing scenario, we ran simulations over at least 60 randomly generated secondary network topologies to study average behavior.
For WM sensing, we fix the sensing interval at 2 seconds [45] , and during each sensing period, sensors measure the RSS using the energy detector for 1 ms, as is typically assumed in 802.22 WRANs [46] . The radius of the fusion range for cooperative sensing is fixed at R s ¼ 1 km, which is shown to be near optimal for WM sensing in an 802.22 WRAN [14] . The shadow fading dB-spread dB is assumed to be 5 dB, as it is typically assumed in IEEE 802.22 WRANs. The shadowing-decorrelation distance is set to 150 m, 7 and the path-loss exponent is 4. We assume these parameters are estimated at the time of system deployment, and thus known a priori to the secondary system.
For WM tracking, we set the number of samples for SMC to n s ¼ 40 and set the resampling threshold N thr empirically in the range N thr 2 ½3; 5, depending on the network environment. In what follows, the figures of localization error plot the average as well as AE 0:25 interval. Fig. 3a shows that SMC-based tracking suffers from the unpredictability in RSSs due to shadow fading, resulting in a rapid increase in error as dB increases. By contrast, SOLID maintains a small average localization error (<35 m) for all simulated scenarios thanks to its estimation of the primary location and shadow-fading gains, which refine each other throughout the tracking process.
Effects of Shadow Fading

Effects of Noise Power
The measurement noise (including the effects of multipath fading) in RSSs can adversely affect the accuracy of shadow-fading estimation. Fig. 3b shows that the average localization error increases with noise power ( m ) since a large m makes the shadow-fading estimation less accurate. Therefore, it is crucial to combat or reduce the effect of noise power m at each cooperative sensor in order to fully benefit from shadow-fading estimation in SOLID.
Although the standard deviation of Rayleigh fading, m , can be as large as 5.5 dB in practice, many techniques can be used to significantly reduce the effect of multipath fading, e.g., exploiting antenna diversity [47] . For sensors with a single transceiver, this can be accomplished by extending the sensing time (longer than the channel coherence time) [48] at the expense of increased sensing overhead (e.g., time and energy). In what follows, we assume the standard deviation of the noise power is fixed at m ¼ 0:3 dB. Fig. 3c plots the localization error for various average sensor densities. The figure shows that the average localization error decreases as the sensor density increases for both schemes. However, the error drops faster with SOLID, significantly outperforming the SMC-based tracking scheme thanks to its ability to accurately track the shadow fading gains. When the average sensor density is ¼ 3:5=km 2 , SOLID reduces the error by up to 88 percent compared to SMC-based tracking.
Effects of Sensor Density
Attack-Tolerance of SOLID
We now demonstrate SOLID's attack-tolerance while varying two key attack parameters; attack strength and attack population. We fix the attack frequency at 0.3, i.e., compromised sensors launch attacks independently with probability 0.3 in each sensing stage. We set the detection and blocking thresholds to ¼ 5 dB and N B ¼ 2, respectively. To demonstrate the efficacy of SOLID, we compare the following three testing schemes: 1) SMC-based tracking, 2) SOLID without attack detector, and 3) SOLID with attack detector.
Impact of Attack Strength
Here, we show the impact of attack strength on the localization accuracy, while varying the attack strengths in the range between 0 and 10 dB. We assume that the attack population is 30 percent, i.e., each sensor is compromised with probability 0.3. Fig. 4 shows that the localization performance of SMCbased tracking suffers from large attack strengths due to its lack of ability to detect and filter out manipulated sensing reports. For a similar reason, the localization error of SOLID without attack detector also increases with increasing attack strengths. However, this scheme significantly lowers the average error compared to the SMCbased tracking, because of its ability to accurately track the shadowing gains.
In contrast, SOLID with attack detector maintains a low localization error even in the case of large attack strengths. This performance superiority can be explained as follows. On one hand, the attack detector in SOLID successfully withstands weak attacks, i.e., < ¼ 5 dB, because such attacks do not influence the localization outcome much even though they can evade the attack detector. On the other hand, the attack detector can easily detect strong attacks, i.e., > ¼ 5 dB, thanks to its ability to detect large deviations in shadowing estimation caused by manipulated sensing reports.
However, Fig. 4 shows that the localization error of SOLID with attack detector still increases slowly with increasing attack strength for the following two reasons. First, the detection delay (i.e., N B ) allows an attacker to influence the localization outcome. Second, the localization error induced by the attackers increases the attack falsealarm rate, i.e., misclassifying legitimate sensors as malicious/faulty, thus increasing the fraction of attackers in the set of cooperative sensors.
Impact of Attacker Population
Next, we examine the impact of the attacker population by varying the fraction of compromised sensors from 0 to 50 percent. We fix the attack strength at 5 dB. As expected, Fig. 5 shows that a larger attacker population degrades localization performance because it is harder to identify compromised sensors. Moreover, a large fraction of compromised sensors will remove a large number of sensors from the cooperating group, which, in turn, negatively affects localization performance. Nevertheless, localization error is significantly reduced by SOLID with attack detector compared to the conventional SMC-based tracking scheme even with a large fraction of compromised sensors, demonstrating its robustness against attacks.
Tolerance against "Slow-Poisoning" Attack
To further demonstrate SOLID's high attack-tolerance, we evaluate SOLID's tracking performance under a challenging, slow-poisoning attack, such that malicious sensors incrementally raise the attack strength by Á att (dB) in order to evade detection, while disrupting the localization process. Specifically, we assume that a malicious sensor reports the falsified value P a t;n ðkÞ in the kth sensing stage after joining the set of cooperative sensors, i.e., P a t;n ðkÞ ¼ P t;n þ k Á Á att . Fig. 6 shows that SOLID performs well under a slowpoisoning attack, even without the attack detector, while the performance of the SMC-based tracking suffers greatly from the attack. Thus, the figure demonstrates that SOLID efficiently mitigates the effects of a slow-poisoning attack.
Tradeoff in Determining the Attack Detection Threshold
We now study the impact of detection threshold . In our simulation, we fixed the attack strength at 5 dB, and measured localization accuracy and attack detection performance (in terms of false-alarm and misdetection probabilities), while varying the detection threshold in the range 2 ½2; 14 dB. Fig. 7a indicates that the localization performance of SOLID suffers in the case of low detection thresholds, i.e., < 6 dB, due mainly to overfiltering, i.e., some of the well-behaving sensors are flagged as malicious and then their reports are discarded. On the other hand, too high a detection threshold, i.e., > 6 dB, also degrades localization performance because of underfiltering, in which some of the attackers evade detection, thus adversely influencing the localization process. Fig. 7b clearly shows the tradeoff in determining the attack-detection threshold in terms of false-alarm (denoted by P F A ) and misdetection (denoted by P MD ) probabilities. SOLID is shown to achieve near zero P MD and to maintain a low false-alarm rate, i.e., P F A < 6%, unless the detection threshold is significantly larger than the attack strength, i.e., > 10 dB.
Therefore, the attack detection threshold must be chosen carefully to balance the tradeoff between false-alarm and misdetection probabilities, while considering their dependency on attack strengths and SOLID's tolerance to weak attacks, as observed in Fig. 4 .
Improvement in Spatial Spectrum Reuse
The SUs located within a keep-out-radius of R e from a small-scale PU (e.g., a WM) must vacate the channel to avoid excessive interference with primary communications [6] . The keep-out-radius needs to be enlarged when the localization is inaccurate, thus reducing not only spatial spectrum utilization, but also spectrum sensing efficiency. SOLID achieves high spatial spectrum efficiency by providing accurate location of mobile primary transmitters. We quantify the improvement in spectrum efficiency made by SOLID by introducing the metric of spatial spectrum opportunity loss (SSOL), which is defined as the extended area of PU protection due to the inaccuracy of PUs' localization. Assuming a localization error of , the spatial spectrum opportunity loss due to the inaccuracy of the tracking process can be roughly approximated as SSOL % ðR e þ Þ 2 À R 2 e ¼ 2 þ 2R e . Fig. 8 compares the spatial spectrum opportunity loss of SMC-based tracking and SOLID, assuming the keep-outradius of R e ¼ 2 km, which is reasonably sufficient to provide a typical WM transmission range of 100-150 m. The figure clearly indicates that SOLID maintains small SSOL, improving spatial spectrum efficiency substantially. Note that the improved spectrum efficiency can be translated to other performance metrics, such as network throughput of SUs. For example, the increased keep-out-radius R e indicates that more SUs must vacate the channel to avoid potential interference to primary communications. Therefore, when the keep-out-radius is increased by , additional SUs, i.e., on average ð 2 þ 2Þ where is average SU density, must remain silent on the target channel, thus degrading the overall SU network throughput.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have introduced SOLID, which enables accurate and robust location tracking of small-scale mobile primary users in CRNs. By jointly performing localization and shadow-fading estimation, SOLID significantly improves the accuracy of mobile primary user tracking and masks the effect of manipulated sensing reports by accurately detecting and filtering them out. Our in-depth evaluation results, in realistic wireless environments, show that SOLID reduces localization error significantly both in the absence/presence of attacks, including the "slowpoisoning" attack. The enhanced primary tracking capability offered by SOLID enables the secondary system to improve considerably in overall spectrum efficiency. 
